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Examining vulnerabilities within our current healthcare system we propose borrowing two tools from the fields of
engineering and design: a) Reason’s system approach [1] and b) User-centered design [2,3]. Both approaches are
human-centered in that they consider common patterns of human behavior when analyzing systems to identify
problems and generate solutions. This paper examines these two human-centered approaches in the context of
healthcare. We argue that maintaining a human-centered orientation in clinical care, research, training, and govern-
ance is critical to the evolution of an effective and sustainable healthcare system.
Introduction
With healthcare reform in the spotlight there exists a
window of opportunity to identify weaknesses in our
healthcare system and propose workable solutions. At
the present time, few would argue that the U.S. Health-
care system functions optimally. There are many reasons
for this, including the fragmenting effect of competing
interests in the health marketplace with insufficient
incentives for building and maintaining systems that
knit these fragments together. While the full list of rea-
sons goes beyond the scope of this paper, one critical
weakness to understand is that the U.S. Healthcare sys-
tem at the present time is not inherently human-
centered. That is, on many levels, the current healthcare
system is not designed for optimal use by human beings.
It is when human tendencies are ignored that opportu-
nities for error become insidious.
We propose that a robust and sustainable healthcare
system must be human-centered. Efforts to build and
rebuild parts of the system in a human-centered fashion
require reliable tools. Two of these tools that are cur-
rently underutilized in the area of healthcare are a) Rea-
son’s system approach [1] and b) User-centered design
[2,3]. As a call for more human-centered approaches to
optimizing healthcare delivery, we review these two
approaches, using a variety of examples to illustrate
both real and potential applications.
Two human-centered tools
In his studies of safety, James Reason made a critical
distinction between two ways of understanding why
human errors occur: the person approach and the sys-
tem approach [1]. While the person approach blames
the individual most closely linked to the error, the sys-
tem approach takes into account all of the many contri-
buting factors that played a role in the manifestation of
the error.
As a part of the system approach, Reason proposed
the “Swiss cheese” model to explain why system failures
occur [4]. In this model he suggests that in complex sys-
tems, failures are prevented from occurring much of the
time because of a variety of barriers that serve as checks
and balances. In most systems, however, these barriers
have areas of weakness. When a series of weaknesses
align, a hole in the system appears such that barriers no
longer exist to prevent failure and a breakdown occurs.
Latent errors refer to weaknesses in the system that,
when combined with relevant stressors, contribute to
active failures. Active failures are the unsafe acts com-
mitted by people who are in direct contact with the
patient or system [4].
According to Reason, “The basic premise in the sys-
tem approach is that humans are fallible and errors are
to be expected, even in the best organizations.” What is
so striking about this model is that it provides a frame-
work for viewing people as vulnerable, rather than
inherently faulty. Reason explicitly acknowledges the
existence of identifiable vulnerabilities within and out-
side of each person that give rise to errors when those
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human-centered approach, he neutralizes any implicit
blame by saying that “even the best organizations” are
fallible.
While Reason’s system approach is a top-down
method for analyzing problems, user-centered design is
a bottom-up method for developing solutions. The term
‘user-centered design’ w a sc o i n e db yD o n a l dN o r m a n
and became widely adopted after he published User-
Centered System Design: New Perspectives on Human-
Computer Interaction in 1986 and then The Psychology
Of Everyday Things in 1988 [2,3]. User-centered design,
of which human-centered design is a specific instance, is
a technique used in the field of engineering that priori-
tizes the relevant characteristics of a product user
throughout the design of a product.
Taking the example of designing an automobile dash-
board, a user-centered designer would spend a great
deal of time in the proverbial shoes of the future driver,
trying to understand his needs (What pieces of informa-
tion does he need to monitor while driving?), preferences
(Would he like to have the current radio station dis-
played at eye level?) and limitations (How many pieces
of information can he process simultaneously?), among
other things. Like Reason’s system approach, user-cen-
tered design starts with the assumption that all users
have basic need and limitations and that it is the
designer’s responsibility to understand, anticipate, and
design in accordance with these needs and limitations
[3].
The system approach has only recently been applied
to the field of healthcare, despite successful use in other
fields, including engineering, mining, nuclear power, and
aviation [5]. One reason for this delayed application is
the fact that most hospitals grew in direct response to
social needs, without priority being given to top-down
design [6]. That is, hospitals were not viewed like fac-
tories, which were often built with attention to ques-
tions of efficiently and safety. Use of system-level
analyses may have also lagged behind because of the
default assumption that efficiency and safety would not
merit careful attention, related to the stereotype that
health care professionals, and physicians in particular,
are perfect [5].
After a series of egregious errors that caught the
attention of healthcare professionals, the media, and the
public, it became clear that something needed to be
done to address the issue of patient safety [7]. In 1999,
Institutes of Medicine (IOM) published a powerful
report entitled, “To Err is Human,” which fueled an
already growing shift from viewing errors as problems
of individuals to problems of systems. However, even in
light of this shift, there remains a long history of a cul-
ture of blame and shame that held single individuals
responsible for negative outcomes [8-10]. Active efforts
will likely be required to achieve a complete shift in per-
spective and, in the view of some, the shift may never be
complete [11-13].
Like Reason’s system approach, user-centered design is
also relatively new to healthcare and has been applied
only to a limited degree. According to Zhang, a Health
Information Technologist, “In healthcare...the culture is
still to train people to adapt to poorly designed technol-
ogy, rather than to design technology to fit people’s
characteristics” [14]. This failure of widespread adoption
of user-centered design methods occurs, even despite
requests for its application in a number of areas, includ-
ing the development of interactive health technologies
for patients [15,16]. Devito Dabbs cites the following
possible reasons for the lagging adoption of user-
centered methods by those in healthcare: lack of appre-
ciation for the importance of usability testing, lack of
time and resources to devote to upfront research and
development, limited expertise in the principles and
techniques of user-centered design, and the tendency to
develop information health technologies based on devel-
oper-driven needs and priorities rather than those of the
intended users [17].
Next we will explore the ways in which the system
approach and user-centered design have been applied.
A System Approach to Healthcare: Allowing for Human
Nature
An eminently practical consequence of examining error
with a system approach is the ability to generalize ana-
lyses to large groups of people. Whereas a person
approach assumes that errors result largely from
uniquely personal failures, the system approach suggests
that the errors stem from identifiable patterns or ten-
dencies, either within human beings in general or in the
system’s environment. The next section will outline
some of the findings from this and other areas of
research that illuminate relevant aspects of human
behavior.
Predictably irrational: People have systematic cognitive
biases
The fields of cognitive psychology and behavioral eco-
nomics, among others, have taught us that human
beings are much less rational than they appear on the
surface [18-20]. Yet the field of medicine has developed,
in large part, as if healthcare providers, and diagnosti-
cians in particular, were entirely rational beings. In
recent years, the role of cognitive biases in medical edu-
cation and training has gained some attention [21],
though on the whole there still exists a relative under-
appreciation of these cognitive biases among attending
and trainees alike [22,23]. Some of the most common
Searl et al. Health Research Policy and Systems 2010, 8:35
http://www.health-policy-systems.com/content/8/1/35
Page 2 of 7systematic information processing biases include:
￿ Anchoring: the tendency to overvalue (anchor) one
piece of information when making a decision. For
example, patients insufficiently adjust their subjective
risk to the objective risk value communicated by
healthcare providers [20,24-26].
￿ Authority bias: the tendency to overvalue the opi-
nion of a perceived authority and undervalue one’s
own judgment in comparison. Studies have demon-
strated that physicians sometimes tend to overvalue
so-called expert opinions, in lieu of using critical
analysis [25-27].
￿ Availability heuristic: making an estimate accord-
ing to how easily an example can be brought to
mind, while discounting more relevant information.
Some studies have shown that diagnostic error can
be influenced by this heuristic [25,26,28-30].
￿ Base rate fallacy: when available statistical data
(base rates) are ignored in favor of one’so w n
hypothesis [20].
￿ Confirmation bias: the tendency to search for or
interpret information in a way that confirms one’s
preconceptions [31,32].
￿ Framing: interpreting a situation using a narrow
lens [25,26,33-35].
￿ Fundamental attribution error: the tendency to
over-emphasize personality variables while under-
emphasizing situational variables to explain specific
behaviors [36,37].
￿ Hindsight bias: the inclination to see past events as
if they had been predictable without acknowledging
that all of the relevant information had not been
available at the time [38].
￿ Illusory correlation: an erroneous conclusion about
an association that seems real but does not actually
exist [39,40].
￿ In-group bias: the tendency for people to give pre-
ferential treatment to others they perceive to be
members of their own groups [41,42].
￿ Overconfidence effect: excessive confidence in one’s
own answers to questions. An example of this is the
finding that physicians, and particularly those in
training, underestimate their own errors and overes-
timate the errors of their colleagues, even when
errors in judgment are pointed out to them
[22,43,44].
￿ Premature closure: the tendency to jump to a con-
clusion prior to having all of the relevant informa-
tion, typically in order to escape the experience of
doubt and uncertainty [45]
￿ Representativeness heuristic: coming to a conclu-
sion based on how much a hypothesis resembles
available data. While this is helpful in making
quickly decisions in everyday life, it can result in
neglect of relevant base rates [20,25,26,46].
￿ Stereotyping: when one expects a member of a
group to have certain characteristics solely because
of group membership, not because of individual
characteristics [42].
Shame and Blame: People hide their errors in punitive
environments
Healthcare providers are reluctant to report their own
errors in a system fraught with risk and blame that
relies on tort law as a major regulatory force. One of
the consequences of Tort law and financial markets
being significant regulatory forces in the absence of
non-punitive, transparent error reporting mechanisms is
that clinicians and healthcare delivery systems have
become reluctant to report errors, thus perpetuating
high risk levels and failing to integrate corrective feed-
back into the system.
Clinicians are unlikely to respond to increased pres-
sure to report within this climate, and would be more
responsive to a culture that emphasizes safety and
encourages learning over shaming. Learning cultures
facilitate detection and sharing of errors, reflection upon
and understanding of underlying causes, proactive invol-
vement in professional life, and increased dedication to
improving safety [47].
In an ideal world, clinicians would speak openly about
their mistakes. Senior staff would be viewed as role
models, secure about reporting and learning from their
own errors. Asking for and receiving support would be
encouraged and viewed as a strength rather than a
weakness. Safety cultures would be strongly endorsed by
top-down organizational policies and promoted by lea-
ders as best practices.
Physicians on a pedestal: Social power structures in
healthcare
The field of medicine has been traditionally hierarchical
in nature. In any hierarchical system, those with less
power often find that challenging or making requests of
those with more power can come at a cost. Not surpris-
ingly, this is true in healthcare settings. As a result,
when faced with the question of whether to challenge
more powerful individuals, the less powerful individuals
must decide which costs to incur–those resulting from a
challenge or from withholding potentially corrective
feedback [48]. For example, interrupting a physician by
a page to report an error is a burden on physicians,
who, in turn, can easily disregard the corrective feed-
back or not assimilate the seriousness of the error dur-
ing the translation of the order into action. Correcting a
charismatic physician may also lead to consequences
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alienation from other members of the team, delay in
promotion etc.). The result of this dynamic is that the
people with less power are less likely to identify their
own errors for fear of criticism or retribution, thus
planting the seed of a closed loop system where little
can be learned.
Risks and benefits of teamwork: Bringing out the best
and the worst
A team includes people working together to achieve
shared goals. Effective teams share resources, communi-
cate clearly, and coordinate their efforts to adapt to
change [49]. Observational studies and retrospective
analyses have shown that flawed teamwork rather than
lack of clinical skills is a major contributor in the occur-
rence of errors [49,50]. Effective communication is the
cornerstone around which a team is built; it should be
done with trust and understanding and without fear of
hierarchy. On the contrary, a leader should flatten the
power distance and facilitate speaking up [51].
In healthcare, teamwork relies heavily on communica-
tion and coordination. Although healthcare providers
may perceive quality of teamwork differently, they share
a mental model that becomes essential to their team-
work [52]. No matter what the outcomes of new train-
ing programs, heightened public awareness and accuracy
in timely diagnosis turn out to be, clinicians need to be
empowered by their successful achievements as a team
and supported by their organizations when they make
mistakes [53]. Leadership styles that value contribution
from staff will promote a climate where the information
is shared in a timely manner, effectively and openly. In
addition, this leadership style will increase staff well-
being [54]. A healthy, happier staff is one that can shift
flexibly between implicit coordination (during routine
condition) and explicit coordination (during critical
intervention) to ensure the highest level of patient safety
[55].
The fallacy of the health belief model: Knowing and
doing are different things
Over the past 40 years advances in health psychology
have demonstrated that humans often engage in beha-
viors that they well know to be dangerous or unhealthy.
This means that health education alone, while certainly
important, is likely to be insufficient to trigger behavior
change. Yet, this is still the primary means of attempting
to elicit behavior change in provider-patient relation-
ships. The traditional role of the all-knowing and all-
powerful physician) sets forth the implicit message, “I
know what is best. I tell you (the patient) what to do
and you conform.” There was very little room for incor-
porating the experience of the patient into early models
of healthcare delivery. Similarly, early health behavior
change theories (e.g. Health Belief Model) assumed that
if people were educated about health promoting beha-
viors and about consequences of high-risk behaviors,
they wouldn’t do them. We now recognize that human
behavior is driven by a complex set of interacting vari-
ables, only one of which is knowledge about what is
best for one’s health [56,57]. Many of the more recent
health behavior change models take more human-
centered approaches that make allowances for what are
now known to be common errors in logic and responses
to emotional, physical, and environmental cues that dis-
tract from one’s health goals. However, many elements
of our current healthcare delivery systems are still
founded on the premise of the less human-centered
health belief model.
Coping with uncertainty: The ultimate challenge
In his studies of human error, Reason found that uncer-
tainty in one’s environment or understanding of one’s
goals was a significant factor that contributed to making
errors [58]. Studies of misdiagnosis have found that
diagnostic uncertainty increases the likelihood that an
incorrect diagnosis will be made [59]. Patients do not
help in correcting the process as they also struggle in
the face of uncertainty, are fearful or too trusting of
authority figures [22]. In a nutshell, while the diagnostic
process requires robustness and flexibility to deal with
the uncertainty of not knowing or not knowing enough,
physicians remain not trained nor do they tolerate
uncertainty hence committing mistakes. Frequently
patients will simply leave thec a r eo fap h y s i c i a nw i t h
whom they are dissatisfied and go elsewhere searching
for certain answers. Given inadequate feedback, physi-
cians may think that patients are not coming to the
clinic because they are cured while, in truth, patients
may have simply preferred not to return.
User-Centered Design in Healthcare: A Promising Start
Early applications of user-centered design were seen pri-
marily in medical engineering, health information man-
agement, and web design [60-63]. Safety-oriented
analyses and solutions have been at the forefront of
user-centered applications in healthcare, with such
examples as bar-code technology [64] and checklists
[65]. User-centered approaches to the study and devel-
opment of provider tools have also expanded into more
traditional areas of health research, including care coor-
dination [66], data entry interface design [67,68], cogni-
tive processes engaged during healthcare procedures
[69,70], patient monitoring tools [71], and development
of screening tools [72,73].
Similarly, user-centered research focused on patients
has grown over the last few years, primarily in
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interactive e-health technologies [17,77,78].
Despite the promise of these emerging areas of
research and practice, when considering the scope of all
ongoing research, program development, and health
technology innovation within the U.S. healthcare system,
user-centered design is found only in a very small pro-
portion of work being done. There are still many pro-
blems within the area of healthcare that require
application of a user centered approach, including stan-
dardization of self-care tools, development of assessment
and treatment tools for emotional health, chronic care
tools, and preventative care systems. This paper is a call
for shifting user-centered design toward the mainstream
of work in these areas.
Future applications of the system approach
While a system approach to understanding errors in
healthcare has played a critical role in shifting from a Cul-
ture of Blame to a Culture of Safety, significantly more
work is yet to be done in understanding the psychological
and behavioral drivers of healthcare providers, patients,
and other members of the system, such as family members,
administrators, and those responsible for building and
maintaining equipment and systems. The role of psycholo-
gical defense mechanisms is not well understood and likely
plays an important role in predicting areas of vulnerability
for all members of the healthcare system. At the same
time, a system approach to understanding how to harness
and cultivate the strengths of different parts of the system
is equally important to study and has been given less atten-
tion than patterns of vulnerability and weakness [79].
Future applications of a human-centered approach
One of the most critical areas of healthcare requiring a
human-centered approach is the development of standar-
dized reporting mechanisms that, through open feedback
loops, allow for the reporting of and learning from medi-
cal errors. Some of the benefits of applying a human-
centered approach to the development of a safety report-
ing system include: an emphasis on understanding and
learning over blame, attention to the existing vulnerabil-
ities in the system, design focused on motivating people
to report, an emphasis on iterative improvements, and a
place for a participatory research component.
A number of Patient Safety Reporting Systems(PSRS)
have emerged since 1999 with the goal of providing
such mechanisms of feedback. Some are government
sponsored entities, such as the PSRS developed by the
VA system and NASA in 2000 and others are privately
organized, most often founded by industry, professional
or consumer groups.
The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of
2005 is a landmark piece of legislation that provides
Federal legal privilege and confidentiality protections to
information reported in reference to patient safety con-
cerns. It developed out of the recognition that, despite
the importance of reporting for the purpose of learning
about how and why errors occur, many healthcare provi-
ders would naturally be reluctant to report their own
errors for fear of retribution. Prior to the passing of this
act, studies had demonstrated that granting immunity to
personnel reporting errors voluntarily would have a posi-
tive impact on the reporting incidence of errors [80].
In a non-punitive, learning culture, punishment and
humiliation are replaced by an emphasis on trust and
positive change. These elements are critical for mainte-
nance and promotion of a safety culture. When health-
care professionals feel that they can report their errors
without losing their jobs and reputation or fear of litiga-
tion, they will be more likely to cooperate with a root
cause analysis approach to identifying and understand-
ing errors [81].
Other areas that would benefit from application of a
human-centered approach include:
￿ Training in social dynamics: Integrating knowledge
of social dynamics into training of healthcare profes-
sionals and into routine team practices would be
useful in creating a widespread understanding of
human tendencies.
￿ Accounting for patient biases: The average patient
cannot be expected to pursue positive health beha-
viors based only on knowledge of healthy and
unhealthy behaviors. Rather, integration of education
with techniques that account for known biases (e.g.,
motivational interviewing, behavioral economics, etc)
may prove more effective in increasing the health
activation levels of patients.
￿ Accounting for clinician biases: Awareness of and
compensation for clinician biases can be addressed
through peer consultation and application of reflec-
tive practices that incorporate knowledge of one’s
strengths and limitations.
￿ Building resilience: Resilience refers to the degree
to which a system continuously prevents, detects,
mitigates or ameliorates hazards or incidents leading
to bounce back to its original ability to provide core
functions following the occurrence of adverse events
[82]. Taking action to reduce risk and prevent the
reoccurrence of the same or incident improves sys-
tem resilience [82].
Conclusion: A sustainable solution must be
human-centered at every level
An understanding of human thought processes, emo-
tions, and behaviors needs to guide the design of
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what we know about human tendencies to build health-
care systems that optimize both patient behaviors and
clinician behaviors. The more we know about how peo-
ple naturally work best, the more we can leverage that
to address the current problems related to patient safety
[79]. All users of the healthcare system can benefit from
this type of approach. Our paper is an open invitation
to an overdue discussion about placing human beings in
the center of our thinking about healthcare. We main-
tain that robust research and training efforts focused on
the issues described in this paper will be critical for the
evolution of a sustainable healthcare system.
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